The scaling of frontal cortex in primates and carnivores by Bush, Eliot C. & Allman, John M.
The scaling of frontal cortex in primates
and carnivores
Eliot C. Bush* and John M. Allman
Biology Division, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125
Edited by Charles F. Stevens, The Salk Institute for Biological Studies, La Jolla, CA, and approved January 12, 2004 (received for review September 9, 2003)
Size has a profound effect on the structure of the brain. Many brain
structures scale allometrically, that is, their relative size changes
systematically as a function of brain size. Here we use independent
contrasts analysis to examine the scaling of frontal cortex in 43
species of mammals including 25 primates and 15 carnivores. We
find evidence for significant differences in scaling between pri-
mates and carnivores. Primate frontal cortex hyperscales relative to
the rest of neocortex and the rest of the brain. The slope of frontal
cortex contrasts on rest of cortex contrasts is 1.18 (95% confidence
interval, 1.06–1.30) for primates, which is significantly greater than
isometric. It is also significantly greater than the carnivore value of
0.94 (95% confidence interval, 0.82–1.07). This finding supports the
idea that there are substantial differences in frontal cortex struc-
ture and development between the two groups.
Comparative neuroanatomists have long been interested inthe relationship between size and brain structure. Early work
focused on how the brain scales with the body, and how gross
morphological characteristics such as cortical folding change
with size (1, 2). More recently, emphasis has been put on the
scaling of various brain structures with each other and with
overall brain size (3–6).
The scaling of frontal cortex presents an interesting case.
From the beginning, workers have been drawn to this region
because of the supposition that volume increases occurred in the
line leading to humans. Brodmann’s regio frontalis consisted of
frontal cortex minus areas 4 and 6 and parts of the cingulate. He
described a ‘‘progressive’’ expansion of this region in the primate
line going from prosimians to humans, and argued that primates
more closely related to humans have a disproportionally larger
regio frontalis (7). However, primates more closely related to
humans also have larger brains. The disproportionate expansion
of the frontal region could be due to allometric scaling only.
Von Bonin (8) explicitly argued that frontal cortex hyperscales
with brain size, and man has ‘‘precisely the frontal lobe which he
deserves by virtue of the overall size of his brain’’. A number of
subsequent workers used allometric lines as a kind of standard
for comparing whether human frontal cortex is bigger or smaller
than one would expect for a similarly sized primate (9–11).
However, neither Von Bonin nor later workers had adequate
data or methods to establish whether frontal cortex hyperscaling
is a regular and systematic relationship with size, or simply an
artifact of grade differences. As was originally pointed out by
Felsenstein (12), the phylogenetic structure of a sample of
species can make it appear that there is a systematic relationship
between two variables where none exists.
To make the distinction between a series of grade shifts and
systematic allometry, one must apply a method such as inde-
pendent contrasts, which can factor out the effects of phylogeny
(12). In addition, one must have data from a phylogenetically
wide sample of species. Here we examine the scaling of frontal
cortex in a large sample of mammals that includes broad
representation in two orders, primates and carnivores. We
analyze the resulting data by using the method of independent
contrasts.
Materials and Methods
Brains. We examined brains from a total of 55 mammalian species
in eight orders. The majority of these are located at the com-
parative brain collection at the University of Wisconsin (Mad-
ison). Brains were embedded in celloidin and stained with
thionin. (Our Daubentonia madagascariensis measurement was
based on a T2 weighted MRI in conjunction with Nissl-stained
frozen sections from the same brain.) We took a systematic
random sample from each brain. That is, slices were chosen at
a regular sampling interval with the position in the first interval
randomized. We used 40 or more slices per brain, digitizing these
with a standard office flatbed scanner (Epson Expression 800)
at 800 dpi. In cases where a slice we needed was missing, we took
an adjacent slice or a slice from a corresponding fiber series. In
several cases where no suitable substitute was available, we
interpolated between adjacent slices in our series to obtain
volume measurements. The digital images were roughly aligned
for convenience, and analyzed by using the AMIRA software
package. Coefficients of error for our volume measurements
were 0.03, using the method of Gundersen et al. (13). Our raw
measurements are shown in Table 2, which is published as
supporting information on the PNAS web site.
Demarcation of Boundaries. Frontal cortex is neocortex anterior to
the motor–somatosensory border. Except for the borders of
primate V1, this is the most recognizable and reliable cytoar-
chitectonic border in the neocortex (14). Several notable fea-
tures of the cytoarchitecture change here. Motor cortex has large
Betz cells in layer 5. In addition, it lacks a granular layer 4, which
is present in somatosensory cortex. Several photomicrographs of
motor cortex and its border with somatosensory cortex are
shown in Figs. 2–5, which are published as supporting informa-
tion on the PNAS web site. The motor–somatosensory border is
also a landmark that has been identified electrophysiologically in
a number of species. We referred to this work where available:
Hylobates and Pan (15), Allouatta (16), Aotus (17), Perodicticus
(18), Otolemur (19), Galago (20), Nycticebus (21), Procyon (22),
and Dasypus (23). We also referred to several cytoarchitectonic
studies for Lemur and Potos (14) and Choloepus (24). We were
able to identify the motor somatosensory border in 43 species of
mammals, including 25 primates and 15 carnivores, and we used
its position and trajectory to divide cortex in two. On the lateral
side in primates, we followed its trajectory until it intersected the
sylvian fissure. We then followed the sylvian forward, counting
everything anterior of where the sylvian disappears as frontal
cortex. In carnivores, on the lateral side we followed the trajec-
tory of the motor somatosensory border until it reached the
coronal sulcus. We followed the coronal until it disappeared or
until we reached the level of the cruciate sulcus, whichever came
first. We counted everything anterior to that as frontal cortex. In
the three other mammals, there were not limiting sulci of this
type, and we simply followed the trajectory of the motor
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somatosensory border all of the way to the edge of neocortex.
Medially in all mammals, we followed the trajectory of the
motor–somatosensory border, through the cingulate down to the
level of the corpus callosum. We identified the borders of
neocortex in our sample by using well known cytoarchitectonic
criteria.
Shrinkage. Celloidin embedding causes shrinkage. We corrected
for overall shrinkage by using pictures taken of the brains before
embedding. These were from standard views and included a scale
bar. By comparing various measurements on these pictures with
our scanned images, we were able to make estimates of slice
dimensions before celloidin embedding. In Homo sapiens and
Propithecus verreauxi, no presectioning picture was available. In
these cases, we scaled our measurements so that whole brain
volumes would match those measured by Stephan et al. (25).
A second issue relates to differential shrinkage of various
structures. Our frontal cortex scaling results have been presented
as comparisons between two regions of neocortical gray matter.
If gray matter in different regions of cortex shrinks differently,
it would present a problem for us. We therefore examined two
celloidin shrinkage studies, a beaver and a capybara, from the
Wisconsin collection. One hemisphere of these brains was
sectioned frozen, whereas the other was sectioned after being
embedded in celloidin. We measured shrinkage in the celloidin
hemisphere relative to that in the frozen one. We did not feel
that we could identify the motor–somatosensory border reliably
in these two rodent brains, so we used the caudal end of the
corpus callosum as a landmark. We used it to divide the cortex
into two parts. In the beaver, we found that gray matter caudal
to the corpus callosum shrank to 39.6% of its original volume in
the celloidin hemisphere. In our other, rostral division of beaver
neocortex, gray matter shrank to 39.1% of its original volume. In
the capybara, the values were 33.7% and 32.1% for caudal and
rostral divisions, respectively. In both brains, the amount of
shrinkage found in the two divisions of neocortex was very
similar. We conclude that differential shrinkage of neocortical
gray matter within the same brain is not a significant problem for
our analysis. We also looked at scaling between neocortical gray
matter and the subcortical brain, i.e., whole brain minus neo-
cortical gray and white. In the shrinkage studies, we looked at the
shrinkage of the rest of the brain, which is whole brain minus
neocortex and cerebellum, which is missing in these studies. Rest
of brain shrank to 43.2% and 40.7% of its original volume in the
beaver and capybara, respectively. These values differ somewhat
from the values for neocortical gray matter, but they do not differ
by enough to account for our results, even if they varied
systematically with brain size, which they almost certainly do not.
Data Analysis. Data analysis was performed in the R language
(26). To calculate independent contrasts (12), we used the APE
package for R (27), applied to log-transformed volume data.
Phylogenies and dates come from the literature (28–33), and a
copy of the tree we used is available in Figs. 6 and 7, which are
published as supporting information on the PNAS web site. In
cases of soft polytomies, we separated uncertain nodes with
branches of length zero and reduced the degrees of freedom
correspondingly in our statistical analysis (34). The 95% confi-
dence intervals we report have been calculated with these
minimum degrees of freedom, and so represent the maximum
range. We used regression forced through the origin to calculate
slopes, and followed the recommendations of Garland et al. (35)
and Harvey and Pagel (36) to ensure that the requirements for
regression were met. Regression coefficients we present were
calculated by using least squares. Because our variables were
log-transformed volumes of brain structures, regressions
were highly significant with high coefficients of determination
(0.93), making it unlikely that the choice of line fitting method
affected the results significantly. We also applied a robust line
fitting method, iterated reweighted least squares (37), and found
that this did not change the results. To determine whether scaling
exponents in two groups were significantly different, we re-
gressed their contrasts together and compared the residuals for
each group with a t test (38).
We wanted to ensure that our observed hyperscaling relation-
ships are not caused by the confounding effect of several
categorical variables: diet, activity pattern, and social structure.
To do this, we used a simple method that involves performing
independent contrasts separately on each category. For example,
if we wish to know whether the apparent hyperscaling between
frontal gray volume and rest of cortex volume is actually caused
by the confounding effect of activity level, we can do the
following. We perform independent contrasts on frontal cortex
and rest of cortex for nocturnal and diurnal primates separately.
We can regress the results for nocturnal and diurnal separately
as well, and if the hyperscaling persists, be confident that activity
pattern is not affecting the scaling relationship. However, this
has the disadvantage of dividing the data into parts and reducing
the sample size used in any individual regression. Instead, we can
take the contrasts that were calculated separately for nocturnal
and diurnal primates and regress them through the origin
together. As long as the phylogenies for nocturnal and diurnal
primates are drawn from the same underlying phylogeny and
have been treated in the same way (e.g., put through the same
transformations on branch lengths), this will give a valid result.
Again, if the hyperscaling persists, we can conclude that it is not
caused by the confounding influence of activity level.
To test whether group size is related to relative frontal cortex
size, we calculated the ratio of frontal cortex to rest of cortex. We
performed Pearson’s correlation between this ratio and log
group size. We also calculated the residuals of frontal cortex
contrasts on rest of cortex contrasts and regressed these against
group size contrasts.
Our group size numbers were population group size from
Wrangham et al. (39). Our categories for diet, activity, and social
structure in primates were based on Rowe (40). For diet, we
divided the primates into three groups: insect eaters, leaf eaters,
and those who eat primarily high quality food of limited avail-
ability (fruit, gums, and seeds). For social structure, we used six
groups: monogamous, fission fusion, troop, solitary, harem, and
human.
Results
We find significant differences in frontal cortex scaling between
primates and carnivores (Fig. 1A). In primates, the slope of
frontal gray matter contrasts on rest of cortex contrasts is 1.18
and the 95% confidence interval is 1.06–1.30 (Table 1 gives a
summary of independent contrasts results). The lower bound of
the primate 95% confidence interval is 1 and the scaling is
therefore significantly greater than isometric. Fig. 1B illustrates
primate hyperscaling in a different way.
The scaling exponent for carnivore frontal cortex contrasts vs.
rest of cortex contrasts is significantly less than for primates (P
0.03, t 2.22, df 35). The carnivores show no tendency toward
frontal cortex hyperscaling (Fig. 1C). Their exponent is 0.94
(95% confidence interval, 0.82–1.07), which is not significantly
different from isometric scaling.
We see that primates and carnivores differ in how these two
regions of cortex scale with each other. Does this result primarily
from differences in frontal cortex, rest of cortex, or both? We can
examine this by looking at the scaling of the cortical regions with
the subcortical brain. Table 1 makes it clear that the scaling
exponent for rest of cortex vs. the subcortical brain does not
differ significantly in primates and carnivores. However, the
exponent for frontal cortex vs. subcortical brain does differ in the
two groups. Table 1 also shows that, consistent with previous
Bush and Allman PNAS  March 16, 2004  vol. 101  no. 11  3963
N
EU
RO
SC
IE
N
CE
claims, neocortex as a whole scales up relative to the rest of the
brain in mammals (1, 41). Taken separately, primates and
carnivores show neocortex vs. subcortical brain scaling trends
similar to the rest of mammals and to each other. Thus, primates
and carnivores show similar scaling relationships for neocortex
as a whole and for the nonfrontal parts of the cortex. But frontal
cortex scaling in the two groups differs significantly.
Fig. 1B hints at the possibility of grade differences within
primates. For a given volume of rest of cortex, strepsirrhines
seem to have a larger frontal cortex than haplorhines. To
demonstrate that this is a grade difference, we would want to
show that strepsirrhines and haplorhines have the same scaling
exponent. In our sample, their exponents are not significantly
different (P  0.38, t  0.91, df  22), although this may reflect
our small sample size for the individual primate groups. In
any event, Fig. 1B shows that, where their cortex sizes over-
lap, strepsirrhines tend to have a larger frontal cortex than
haplorhines.
We also examine whether the allometric scaling of frontal
cortex in primates can be accounted for by confounding rela-
tionships with the ecological variables diet, activity pattern, and
social structure. When we calculate the scaling exponents for
frontal vs. rest of cortex contrasts separately for each category
within a variable (e.g., nocturnal and diurnal within activity
pattern) and regress them together, we find that hyperscaling
persists in all three variables (activity pattern: 1.18, 95% confi-
dence interval, 1.05–1.30; diet: 1.11, 95% confidence interval,
0.99–1.24; social structure: 1.20 95% confidence interval, 1.01–
1.40). For all three, the slope remains high, and for two, social
structure and activity pattern, the 95% confidence interval still
excludes 1. In fact, in many cases there is strong hyperscaling
even within single categories (e.g., nocturnal primates 1.33, 95%
confidence interval 1.11–1.56).
We compared the ratio of frontal gray over rest of cortex to
log group size for nine primates and eight carnivores. Pearson’s
correlation between these two quantities was not significant (P
0.3). We also calculated the residuals for a regression of frontal
cortex contrasts on rest of cortex contrasts. We regressed these
against groups size contrasts, again finding no relationship. This
suggests that group size and relative frontal cortex size are not
related.
Discussion
We have provided evidence for significant differences between
primates and carnivores in frontal cortex scaling. In primates,
frontal cortex hyperscales relative to the rest of cortex; in
carnivores, it does not. This suggests important differences in the
development and composition of frontal cortex in the two
groups, and supports the claim that primate frontal cortex differs
from that of other mammals (42).
In addition, our use of the method of independent contrasts
demonstrates that the hyperscaling of primate frontal cortex is
a regular and systematic relationship with size. It is not due to
a series of grade shifts in the line leading to humans.
Our results also provide some new context for old arguments.
Much interest has focused on the question of whether humans
have an unusually large frontal cortex compared to other
primates. Semendeferi et al. (10) showed that frontal cortex
occupies about the same proportion of total cortex in humans as
it does in the great apes. Fig. 1B shows the ratio of frontal to rest
of cortex for the wider range of primates in our data set. Ratios
of frontal to rest of cortex for individual species can be found in
Table 2. Note that catarrhines are not the only group where
species with a high frontal cortex proportion have evolved. Such
species have also evolved independently in platyrrhines (e.g., the
spider monkey) and strepsirrhines (e.g., the aye aye). This is
broadly consistent with the proposition that humans are not
special with regard to the portion of their cortex devoted to
Fig. 1. Frontal cortex scaling. (A) Log–log plot of frontal gray matter volume
vs. rest of cortex gray matter volume for primates, carnivores, and other
mammals. Included are least squares regression lines for primates (red) and
carnivores (blue). Plots B and C take the form of a ratio on the y axis, plotted
against its own denominator on a logarithmic x axis. (B) Ratio of primate
frontal gray matter volume to rest of neocortical gray matter volume plotted
against rest of neocortical gray matter volume. (C) Same as B, but showing
carnivores.
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frontal cortex. Indeed, the presence of a hypermetric scaling
relationship in primate frontal cortex only serves to reinforce the
point.
In addition, our data suggest that there may be a grade
difference between strepsirrhines and haplorhines, with haplo-
rhines actually having a smaller frontal cortex for a given rest of
cortex size. This appears to turn on its head Brodmann’s notion
of a progressive expansion of frontal cortex in the line leading
to humans.
Our results also shed some light on an Aegyptopithecus zeuxis
endocast described by Simons (43). Aegyptopithecus is an early
catarrhine from the Oligocene of Egypt. On this endocast (DUPC
5401), we examined the position of the central sulcus. The sulcus is
40% of the way back as you move along the top of the brain from
the frontal to the occipital pole. In comparison, in a 3D recon-
struction we made of the brain of the living mandrill, the sulcus is
50% of the way back. The ratio of frontal cortex to rest of cortex
in the mandrill is at the bottom of the range among catarrhines in
our sample. This shows that the central sulcus in Aegyptopithecus
was placed relatively far forward, and implies that the animal had
a small frontal cortex compared with living catarrhines. Aegypto-
pithecus had a brain volume of27 cc (43), which is also below the
range of living catarrhines. The small brain volume likely explains
the relatively small frontal cortex. With its small brain, Aegypto-
pithecus represents an element of catarrhine variation that no
longer exists today.
The difference in scaling between primates and carnivores is
striking. Perhaps the most general conclusion to be drawn is that
there are important differences between the two orders in the
molecular regulation of cortical development. We discuss pos-
sible explanations for the scaling difference below, several of
which do not have an immediate connection with development.
However, even in these cases, the ultimate mechanisms behind
the difference must be the mechanisms of development.
Now let us consider several possible explanations for the
scaling difference. In other parts of the brain, allometry has been
argued to be the result of a fixed order of neurogenesis, which
causes later developing structures to become disproportionately
large (3). This theory was intended to explain scaling differences
between structures (e.g., why does neocortex scale up and
hippocampus scale down). It was based on the suggestion that
mammals share a rigid developmental program in which the
order of development for different structures does not change.
Clearly, the theory as originally specified does not explain our
data, where we find that a single structure scales differently
within two mammalian orders. One might propose that primates
and carnivores have a different rigid developmental program in
cortex. To explain our scaling data, primates would need to have
a gradient of neurogenesis that moved from posterior to ante-
rior. However, this is inconsistent with the known facts. In
mammals that have been examined so far, including primates,
anterior areas of neocortex complete neurogenesis before pos-
terior areas do (44–46).
Another possible explanation is that the apparent relationship
with size in primates is actually driven by some other variable that
is itself correlated with size. In primates, ecological variables
such as diet, activity pattern, and social structure are related to
body size. Primate frontal cortex might contain structures,
absent in carnivores, whose relative size correlates with such
variables. This would make it appear that relative frontal cortex
size is correlated with absolute size in primates. We calculated
scaling exponents so as to remove the effect of the categorical
variables diet, activity pattern, and social structure. Our results
suggest that the scaling of frontal cortex is not due to confound-
ing with these variables.
A third alternative follows from a more functional explanation
for scaling. In other contexts, biologists think of scaling in
functional terms, for example the relationship between bone
thickness and body weight (47). In the brain, too, certain scaling
phenomena have been explained functionally. White matter
hyperscales relative to gray matter in neocortex, and this has
been seen as a consequence of the need to maintain connectivity
as brain size increases or as a reflection of systematic changes in
axon diameter (1, 48).
Perhaps a more relevant example can be found in the hyper-
scaling of V1 relative to lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), which
provides all of V1’s input. Stevens (6) pointed out that this might
be a reflection of the information the two structures represent.
In V1, a number of features are represented explicitly that are
implicit in LGN. Edge orientation is an example. As retinal and
LGN resolution increase, the resolution of edge orientation
should also increase. The result is that the total number of cells
involved in representing edge orientation will increase dispro-
portionately with size (6).
Sensory information is repeatedly transformed in the brain,
eventually finding its way back into the world as behavior. Perhaps
the situation described for V1 and lateral geniculate nucleus is not
uncommon. The case of primate frontal cortex could be seen in this
light. Perhaps primates have evolved machinery in their frontal
cortex that is absent in carnivores. This machinery, because of the
nature of the circuits it uses and the information it represents,
increases disproportionately with size.
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Table 1. Independent contrasts results
Structures compared Slope 95% CI No. of contrasts
Primates Frontal neog vs. rest of neog 1.18 1.06–1.30 24
Frontal neog vs. subcort brain 1.38 1.22–1.53 24
Rest of neog vs. subcort brain 1.13 0.98–1.28 24
Total neog vs. subcort brain 1.10 1.01–1.18 37
Carnivores Frontal neog vs. rest of neog 0.94 0.82–1.07 14
Frontal neog vs. subcort brain 1.13 0.98–1.27 14
Rest of neog vs. subcort brain 1.17 1.03–1.31 14
Total neog vs. subcort brain 1.14 1.02–1.26 14
All mammals Total neog vs. subcort brain 1.17 1.11–1.24 93
Slopes and 95% confidence intervals (CI) for regression through the origin of independent contrasts of frontal
cortex gray matter (neog), rest of cortex gray matter, and subcortical (subcort) brain. Data for all mammals and
for primate total neocortex consists of our own data combined with that of Frahm et al. (1).
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